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RENTAL HARMONY WITH ROOMMATES†
YARON AZRIELI∗ AND ERAN SHMAYA∗∗
Abstract. We prove existence of envy-free allocations in markets with heterogenous
indivisible goods and money, when a given quantity is supplied from each of the goods
and agents have unit demands. We depart from most of the previous literature by
allowing agents’ preferences over the goods to depend on the entire vector of prices.
Our proof uses Shapley’s K-K-M-S theorem and Hall’s marriage lemma. We then
show how our theorem may be applied in two related problems: Existence of envy-free
allocations in a version of the cake-cutting problem, and existence of equilibrium in an
exchange economy with indivisible goods and money.
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1. Introduction
A central concept in the literature on economic fairness is envy-freeness [7, 21, 13] –
an allocation is envy-free if no agent prefers the share allocated to another agent over his
own share. In this note we study existence of envy-free allocations when the goods to be
allocated are indivisible and heterogenous, and when in addition there is one perfectly
divisible good (e.g., money). We assume that each agent has a demand for only one of
the indivisible goods and that there is a given quantity supplied of each good.
While there are many real-life examples that can fit into this framework, we will use for
concreteness the terminology of room-assignment and rent-division: Several rooms with
different characteristics and given capacities are available in a house, and the total rent
for the house needs to be divided between the rooms. In this context, envy-freeness boils
down to a market clearing condition: A price is assigned to each room such that when
each agent chooses his favorite room (given the prices) supply exactly equals demand and
the market clears. Following Su [18], we call such a situation rental harmony. Note that
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2even though we use the terms ‘rooms’ and ‘capacities’, we do not make the assumption
that the agents to whom a given good is allocated, whom we call roommates, receive a
joint ownership of the same physical object. Rather, a room with capacity 7 stands for
an indivisible good of which 7 units are supplied, and the roommates represent the 7
agents who received these units. When we say that the price of the room is p we mean
that each unit costs p/7.
There is quite a vast literature dealing with different aspects of this model. Some
of the earlier works include [2], [12], [19] and [20]. Where we depart from most of the
previous works (with a couple of exceptions – see below) is in the type of preferences
that agents may have. Namely, it has been assumed in earlier works that each agent’s
preferences are defined over room-price pairs, i.e., if r, r′ are two rooms with prices p
and p′ respectively, then each agent can say whether he prefers to get room r at price
p or room r′ at price p′. In our model an agent’s favorite room may be a function of
the entire vector of prices. Thus, asking whether an agent prefers (r, p) to (r′, p′) is not
meaningful in our context, since the answer may depend on the prices of other rooms.
There are several reasons why this is an important generalization. First, there may be
‘rational’ reasons for agents’ preferences over rooms to be affected by the entire vector of
prices. This may be the case, for instance, if we view the choice of a room as only part
of a larger ‘consumption plan’. For a concrete example, assume that a forward looking
agent needs to choose between three types of cars, say High (H), Intermediate (I) and
Low (L), with corresponding prices pH > pI > pL. If pH is very high then an agent’s
preferred option may be to buy type I and hold it for a long period of time. But if
pH is reduced then the agent may prefer to buy L initially (saving a larger part of his
budget) and upgrade to H later on when he has accumulated more wealth. Thus, his
choice shifted from I to L even though the prices of these cars did not change.
Prices can also affect preferences if there is incomplete information about the quality
of the rooms, in which case prices may serve as a signaling device. For instance, real-
estate prices in two neighboring suburbs may provide information about their relative
qualities. An increase (or decrease) in the price of houses in one of them may therefore
affect the desirability of the other. Another reason for a similar effect is when agents take
into account the fact that prices affect choices of other agents. In such an interactive
situation there are plausible scenarios in which the entire vector of prices influences
agents’ optimal choices, for example if the price of a neighboring room indicates the
identity of its future inhabitants.
3Another reason to consider such general preferences is that framing effects and other
well-documented ‘behavioral biases’ may be affecting choices in ways that the standard
model cannot capture. For example, assume that rooms A and B have similar charac-
teristics while room C is very different from the other two. Assume further that at a
given price vector p with pA = pB the agent’s preferred choice is room C. If the price of
A increases then room B may become more attractive as it offers similar value as room
A for a ‘bargain’ price. The agent may then choose B instead of C, even though the
prices of these rooms have not changed.
The two papers that are closest to ours are [17] and [18]. They allow for preferences
as general as in our model, but in both these papers the supply of each good (room)
is one, i.e., the number of agents is equal to the number of goods. The proofs in both
these papers rely on this latter assumption. In another recently related paper Velez [23]
studies envy-free allocations in a general model with externalities. The existence result
in that paper is based on the argument of [18]. This paper also makes the assumption
that the supply of each good is one.
Our contribution relative to these works is threefold. First, we allow for ‘roommates’,
i.e., the supply of each of the indivisible goods in the market may be greater than
one, so that agents may be allocated different units of the same good. This extends
the applicability of the result to many markets of interest. Notice that there is no
straightforward way to reduce the problem into one in which the number of agents and
rooms is the same. The reason is that, given the generality of preferences we allow over
goods, there is no way to lift a preference over goods to a preference over units.
Second, our proof introduces a new tool to this literature. The proof relies on a
topological result of Shapley [14] known as the K-K-M-S Theorem. Roughly speaking,
our proof works as follows. For each subset of rooms T we consider the set of price
vectors at which the demand for rooms in T is sufficient to meet the capacity of these
rooms. Our assumptions imply that for each T this is a closed set, and that every
collection of these sets corresponding to a balanced collection of subsets of rooms (see
Appendix A for the definition) covers the simplex of all possible price vectors. It then
follows from the K-K-M-S theorem that there exists a price vector in which the demand
for every subset of rooms is sufficient. By Hall’s marriage lemma it is then possible to
assign rooms to agents to exactly clear the market. Previous papers [1, 5] have used
Hall’s marriage lemma for this purpose, but to our knowledge the use of the K-K-M-S
Theorem to establish the conditions required to apply the lemma is new, and as we show
allows us to get a substantial generalization.
4Third, we show equivalence between the rental harmony environment and two other
problems: The cake division or chore division problem and a model of a discrete exchange
economy with money introduced by Gale [8]. While these problem were studied in
the past using similar mathematical tools, there seems to be no direct argument for
equivalence between them in the previous literature. Thus, we achieve a generalization
of the known results to these three problems and also establish the connection between
them.
In the next section we state and prove our main result. In Section 3 we show how our
theorem may be applied in the two related environments of cake/chore division and a
discrete exchange economy. Section 4 concludes with some final remarks.
2. Theorem and proof
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents and let R be the finite set of available rooms.
For each r ∈ R let c[r] > 0 be a positive integer representing the capacity of room r. We
assume that
∑
r∈R c[r] = n (the case
∑
r∈R c[r] > n trivially follows). Let
F =
{
f : N → R :
∣∣f−1(r)∣∣ = c[r] ∀r ∈ R}
be the set of all assignments of agents to rooms that respect the capacity constraints.
The total rent for the house is normalized to 1, and we let
∆(R) =
{
{p[r]}r∈R :
∑
r∈R
p[r] = 1, p[r] ≥ 0 ∀r ∈ R
}
be the set of possible ways to allocate the rent among the different rooms. We view
∆(R) as a subset of RR and work with the standard topology it inherits from that space.
For p ∈ ∆(R) the support of p is the set supp(p) = {r ∈ R : p[r] > 0}. If T ⊆ R then
∆(T ) = {p ∈ ∆(R) : supp(p) ⊆ T} is the face of ∆(R) corresponding to T .
Given a price vector p, each agent i has a set Li(p) ⊆ R of rooms she likes most at
these prices. We assume
(A1) For each i and p, Li(p) 6= ∅.
(A2) For each i and p, supp(p)c ⊆ Li(p).
(A3) For each i, Li has a closed graph. That is, {p ∈ ∆(R) : r ∈ Li(p)} is closed for
every r ∈ R and every i ∈ N .
Assumption (A1) requires that every agent likes at least one of the rooms given each
price vector. (A2) says that all agents like free rooms. We elaborate on this assumption
in Section 4.1. Finally, (A3) reflects continuity of preferences in prices.
5Theorem 1. Under assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3) there exists p∗ ∈ ∆(R) and an
assignment f ∗ ∈ F such that f ∗(i) ∈ Li(p
∗) for every i ∈ N .
Proof. For every p ∈ ∆(R) and every T ⊆ R let
AT (p) = {i ∈ N : Li(p) ∩ T 6= ∅}
be the set of agents who like one of the rooms in T at prices p. Also, for T ⊆ R define
KT =
{
p ∈ ∆(R) : |AT (p)| ≥
∑
r∈T
c[r]
}
to be the set of price vectors at which the demand for rooms in T is sufficient to meet
the capacity of these rooms.
Claim 1. Each KT is closed in ∆(R).
Proof. Note that
KT =
⋃
B,g
⋂
i∈B
{p ∈ ∆(R) : g(i) ∈ Li(p)},
where the union ranges over all pairs (B, g) such that B is a set of agents with |B| ≥∑
r∈T c[r] and g : B → T is an assignment of rooms in T to the agents in B.
The sets {p ∈ ∆(R) : g(i) ∈ Li(p)} are closed for every i and g by (A3). Therefore,
KT is closed as a finite union of intersections of closed sets. 
Claim 2. If T is a balanced collection of subsets of R (see Appendix A for the definition)
then
⋃
T∈T KT = ∆(R)
Proof. Let T be a balanced collection and let {λT}T∈T be non-negative coefficients sat-
isfying
∑
T∈T λT1T = 1R. Taking scalar product with arbitrary u ∈ R
R we have that
(1)
∑
T∈T
λT
∑
r∈T
u[r] =
∑
r∈R
u[r].
Fix some p ∈ ∆(R) and let g : N → R be a choice of optimal rooms for the players
at prices p (here we use (A1)), so that in particular g−1(T ) ⊆ AT (p) for every T ∈ T .
Then∑
T∈T
λT |AT (p)| ≥
∑
T∈T
λT |g
−1(T )| =
∑
T∈T
λT
∑
r∈T
|g−1(r)| =
∑
r∈R
|g−1(r)| = n =
∑
r∈R
c[r] =
∑
T∈T
λT
∑
r∈T
c[r],
6where the second and last equalities follow from (1) with u[r] = |g−1(r)| and u[r] = c[r],
respectively. It follows that there is T ∈ T such that |AT (p)| ≥
∑
r∈T c[r], so that
p ∈ KT . 
It follows from Claims 1 and 2 that the collection of sets {KT}T⊆R satisfies the
conditions of Corollary 1 in Appendix A. Thus, there exists p∗ ∈ ∆(R) such that
p∗ ∈
⋂
T⊆supp(p∗)KT .
Now, consider a bipartite graph with sets of vertices N and R, where a node i ∈ N is
connected to a node r ∈ R if r ∈ Li(p
∗). If T ⊆ supp(p∗) then |AT (p
∗)| ≥
∑
r∈T c[r] since
p∗ ∈ KT , and if T * supp(p∗) then |AT (p∗)| = n ≥
∑
r∈T c[r] since all the players like
free rooms. It follows that the graph satisfies the condition of Hall’s Marriage Theorem
(See Theorem 3), so there is a subgraph in which each agent is connected to at most one
of the rooms in R and each room in R is exactly full. Since
∑
r∈R c[r] = n each agent is
connected to exactly one room. This defines the required assignment f ∗.

3. Variations of the problem
3.1. Cake cutting and chore division. A closely related problem to the one we con-
sider is the problem of allocating pieces of a cake to a group of agents in a way that every
agent is happy with the piece he got. There are several formulations of this problem,
starting with the classic works [6] and [16]. In the version closest to our model (see, e.g.,
[18, Section 3]) the cake has a rectangular shape and one can only use n−1 vertical cuts
to partition the cake into n pieces (n is the number of agents). Each possible cake-cut
corresponds then to a point in the n − 1 dimensional simplex. If players have their
favorite piece(s) given any cake-cut, and one wants to find a cut in which each player
likes a different piece, then this fits to the special case of our model in which n = |R|
and c[r] = 1 for each r ∈ R.
A similar problem is that of chore division, in which a set of undesirable entities
(‘chores’) is to be allocated to a group of agents. Each chore comes with a monetary
compensation attached to it as well as the number of agents that should be performing
it. One is interested in finding compensations for the various chores such that when
each agent chooses a favorite chore there are enough agents performing each chore.
One example of this situation would be the allocation of administrative tasks to faculty
members in an academic department.
What is common to both these problems, and different from the rental harmony prob-
lem we considered, is that higher amounts of the divisible good are desired by the agents.
7In the rental harmony problem we interpreted the transfers as rent that an agent pays
for his room, and we assumed in (A2) that agents like free rooms. On the other hand,
in the cake cutting problem p[r] = 0 means that the rth piece is empty, and so a hungry
agent would not want to get it. Similarly, in the chore division problem a chore without
compensation is unlikely to be the favorite of any agent.
Consider the following alternative to (A2), which requires that agents never like an
empty piece of cake (or a chore with no compensation):
(A2∗) For each i and p, Li(p) ⊆ supp(p).
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (A1), (A2∗) and (A3) there exists p∗ ∈ ∆(R) and
an assignment f ∗ ∈ F such that f ∗(i) ∈ Li(p
∗) for every i ∈ N .
Proof. Consider preferences L∗i over ∆(R) that satisfy (A1), (A2
∗) and (A3). We trans-
form these preferences to preferences Li over ∆(R) that satisfy (A1), (A2) and (A3) in
the following way: For each room r ∈ R let vr be the vertex of ∆(R) corresponding to
that room, and let Fr = ∆(R\{r}) be the face of ∆(R) opposite to vr. Denote by wr the
barycenter of Fr, that is wr =
1
|R|−1
∑
s∈R\{r} vs. Let ϕ : ∆(R) → ∆(R) be the unique
affine embedding such that ϕ(vr) = wr. Then ϕ maps ∆(R) onto a smaller copy of this
simplex, which lies inside ∆(R). In particular, ϕ maps the boundary of ∆(R) onto the
boundary of ϕ(∆(R)), and the interior of ∆(R) onto the interior of ϕ(∆(R)).
Define Li by
Li(p) =


L∗i (ϕ
−1(p)), if p ∈ interior(ϕ(∆(R))),
L∗i (ϕ
−1(p)) ∪ {r ∈ R : p[r] ≤ 1/|R|}, if p ∈ boundary(ϕ(∆(R))),
{r ∈ R : p[r] ≤ 1/|R|}, otherwise.
In words: If p is in the interior of the image of ϕ (the interior of the small copy of the
simplex) then the favorite rooms under Li are the same as those under L
∗
i when prices
are ϕ−1(p); if p is not in the image of ϕ then only the relatively cheap rooms are the
favorites; if p is on the boundary of the image of ϕ then both rooms that are favorite
under L∗i when prices are ϕ
−1(p) and the relatively cheap rooms are preferred.
It is straightforward to verify that Li satisfies assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3). It fol-
lows from Theorem 1 that there exists an envy-free allocation for these preferences. Let p¯
be the price vector associated with this allocation. We claim that p¯ ∈ interior(ϕ(∆(R))).
To see why notice first that p¯ must be in the image of ϕ, since outside the image only
relatively cheap rooms are liked, and there is always at least one room with price greater
than 1/|R| that no agent would choose. Second, assume by contradiction that p¯ is on the
8boundary of the image of ϕ. Then p¯ ∈ ϕ(Fr) for some room r. But then no agent likes
room r at prices p¯ since by (A2∗) r /∈ L∗i (ϕ
−1(p¯)) and since p¯[r] = 1/(|R| − 1) > 1/|R|.
To conclude, p¯ ∈ interior(ϕ(∆(R))) and therefore Li(p¯) = L
∗
i (ϕ
−1(p¯)) for each agent i.
It follows that there is an envy-free allocation for preferences L∗i with prices ϕ
−1(p¯). 
3.2. Equilibrium in a discrete exchange economy. Our result can be used to prove
existence of equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisible goods and money, as in
the model studied by Gale [8].1 While Gale assumes that supply of each of the indivisible
goods is 1, we allow for arbitrary quantities. The essential difference between the rental
harmony problem we consider and Gale’s exchange economy is that the prices of the
rooms need not sum up to 1. Instead, it is only assumed that the price of each room is
non-negative and bounded above (by 1, without loss). Thus,
C(R) = [0, 1]R
is the set of possible ways to price the different rooms. To stay consistent with our
previous terminology we keep calling the indivisible goods ‘rooms’, even though the
interpretation of the model is somewhat different now. Agents’ preferences are still
represented by the sets Li(p) ⊆ R, so that r ∈ Li(p) means that agent i likes room
r at prices p. We keep assumptions (A1) and (A3) unchanged, but we replace the
monotonicity assumption (A2) with the following arguably more compelling assumption:
(A2’) For each i and p, Li(p) ⊆ {r ∈ R : p[r] < 1}.
Thus, instead of assuming that one of the rooms with price 0 will be chosen we assume
that a room with price 1 (the maximal possible price) will not be chosen. We also weaken
(A1) to allow for the possibility that no room is desirable when the prices of all rooms
is 1. As should be clear from the proof we could weaken (A1) further.
(A1’) For each i and p such that p[r] 6= 1 for some r ∈ R, Li(p) 6= ∅.
Proposition 2. Under assumptions (A1’), (A2’) and (A3) there exists p∗ ∈ C(R) and
an assignment f ∗ ∈ F such that f ∗(i) ∈ Li(p
∗) for every i ∈ N .
Proof. Let B(R) = {p ∈ C(R) : p[r] = 0 for some r} and let ϕ : B(R) ↔ ∆(R)
be a homeomorphism with the property that ϕ(p)[r] = 0 whenever p[r] = 1. Such
a homeomorphism is constructed in Gale’s proof of his theorem. Then ϕ transforms
preferences over B(R) that satisfy (A1’), (A2’) and (A3) into preferences over ∆(R) that
1We thank Rodrigo Velez for pointing us to this Gale paper.
9satisfy (A1), (A2∗) and (A3). By Proposition 1 these preferences admits an envy-free
allocation. 
4. Final comments
4.1. On assumption (A2). Assumption (A2) is probably the most restrictive of our
conditions. Because we did not assume that agents’ preference are monotonic in the
prices, (A2) is the only assumption that captures the intuition that agents are tightfisted:
Free rooms are always at least as good as non-free rooms
It is possible to relax (A2) somewhat without affecting the result. Consider the fol-
lowing assumption:
(A2◦) If supp(p) 6= R then supp(p)c ∩ Li(p) 6= ∅ for every agent i.
This weaker version requires that if there are free rooms then every agent likes at least
one of them. Our result holds unchanged if (A2) is replaced by (A2◦). The reason is
that, given (A3), (A2◦) implies (A2). To see why, fix some p with |supp(p)c| ≥ 2 (if
|supp(p)c| ≤ 1 then there is nothing to prove), and let r¯ ∈ supp(p)c. For every α ∈ (0, 1)
consider the price vector pα defined by pα[r¯] = p[r¯] = 0 and pα[r] = αp[r] + (1− α)
1
|R|−1
for each r 6= r¯. Then r¯ is the only free room at every pα, so by (A2
◦) every agent likes
r¯. But pα → p as α→ 1, so by (A3) every agent likes r¯ at prices p as well.
Still, even this weaker version rules out many standard preferences. In particular,
any quasi-linear preferences in which two rooms have different values do not satisfy
this assumption, and indeed envy-free allocations need not exist with such preferences
(see, for example, [1, Section 6]). However, starting from any preferences Li satisfying
(A1) and (A3) (in particular, quasi-linear preferences), it is possible to obtain modified
preferences that satisfy all three assumptions by altering Li only on the boundary of the
simplex. Specifically, the correspondence L˜i(p) = Li(p) ∪ supp(p)
c satisfies (A1), (A2)
and (A3) whenever Li satisfies (A1) and (A3).
4.2. Efficiency. Some of the previous papers on fair allocations have studied the rela-
tionship between envy-freeness and efficiency. In our model, however, it is not clear what
efficiency means. The reason is that preferences of agents are defined over the indivisible
goods (rooms) conditional on the vector of prices. Thus, one cannot compare allocations
across different price vectors.
An alternative approach, which allows to consider efficiency, would be to start from
preferences over pairs (p, r) where p is the vector of prices and r is the room assigned to
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the agent.2 From such preferences one can derive the preferences over rooms conditional
on prices. However, such across-prices comparisons are not relevant for the question of
existence of envy-free allocations, which is the focus of this note. We therefore preferred
to simplify the exposition and notation by using the conditional preferences as primitive.
4.3. Manipulation. While we proved existence of envy-free allocations, we did not
study whether such allocations can be implemented when agents’ preferences are their
private information. This aspect of the problem has been analyzed under the type of
preferences allowed in the previous literature – see for example [22] and the references
therein. It would be interesting to see which of the results obtained in that literature
apply in our set-up as well.
4.4. Constructing a solution. Our proof is not constructive, as the K-K-M-S theo-
rem guarantees existence of the desired price vector p∗ without showing how to find it.
However, one could construct algorithms that approximate p∗ up to an arbitrary level
of precision. For instance, Shapley’s original proof of the K-K-M-S theorem relies on a
combinatorial result in the spirit of Sperner’s lemma, which can be used approximate p∗.
Once p∗ is found it is easy to construct the envy-free assignment f ∗.
Appendix A. K-K-M-S Theorem
A collection T of subsets of R is called balanced if there are non-negative coefficients
{λT}T∈T such that ∑
T∈T
λT1T = 1R.
The following result by Zhou [25] is a variant of Shapley’s [14] ‘K-K-M-S theorem’,
the only difference being that the covering sets are open rather than closed. See also
[3, 9, 10, 11, 15, 24, 25] for alternative proofs of the K-K-M-S theorem and related results,
as well as for applications of this result in the theory of cooperative games.
Theorem 2. [25] Let {LT}T⊆R be a collection of open subsets of ∆(R) with the property
that ∆(S) ⊆
⋃
T⊆S LT for every S ⊆ R. Then there exists a balanced collection T such
that
⋂
T∈T LT 6= ∅.
Corollary 1. Let {KT}T⊆R be a collection of closed subsets of ∆(R) such that
⋃
T∈T KT =
∆(R) whenever T is a balanced collection. Then there is p∗ ∈ ∆(R) such that p∗ ∈⋂
T⊆supp(p∗)KT .
2This is essentially the approach taken in [23]. In [23] preferences are defined over the entire allocation
(including how rooms are assigned to other agents), but the impersonality axiom implies that agents
only care about the vector of prices and the room assigned to them.
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Proof. For each T define LT = K
c
T . Then each LT is open and
⋂
T∈T LT = ∅ for every
balanced collection T . By Theorem 2 there is S ⊆ R and p∗ ∈ ∆(S) such that p∗ 6∈ LT
for every T ⊆ S. Thus, p∗ ∈
⋂
T⊆SKT ⊆
⋂
T⊆supp(p∗)KT . 
Appendix B. Marriage Theorem with polygamy
Theorem 3. [4, Corollary 3.11] Let G be a bipartite graph with vertex sets X and Y ,
and let c : Y → N. Then G contains a subgraph H such that dH(y) = c[y] for every
y ∈ Y and dH(x) ∈ {0, 1} for every x ∈ X if and only if for every S ⊆ Y
dG(S) ≥
∑
y∈S
c[y].
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